

# Corruption in Modern-Day Africa: A Possible Remedy

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## Abstract

Corruption in governance in Africa has been reported to be endemic, however, in reality; it is substantially perpetuated by continued foreign geopolitical and economic interest. This study provides a quantitative analysis of the underlying causes of corruption in Africa and suggest that instead of a focus on corruption alone, the focus should be on health, education and income production in Africa that can lower the pervasiveness of corruption, and second, on the reality that the current pledged development aid for Africa is totally inadequate to remedy centuries old patterns of exploitation by foreign interest.

**Keywords:** Africa, corruption, education, health, human development

## Introduction

*Terra terram accusat* - attributed to Aurelius Ambrosius (ca. 370 CE) in Codex Egberti (980-993 CE)<sup>1</sup>

Corruption<sup>2</sup> is not inherently endemic in any particular society. Corruption has often been cited to be a major cause of stalled social and economic advancement in Africa (Bunting, 2005; Clements et al., 2004). Africa receives frequent lecturing from Europe, USA, Australia and Canada (EUSAC)<sup>3</sup> about (among other things) the evil of corruption and the need for transparency (see, for example, Clements et al., 2004; Bunting, 2005; Commission for Africa, 2005; Easterly, 2006). This continual badgering does nothing to address the underlying economic causes of corruption. In particular, African governments are invariably blamed for corruption as a pretext to discontinue or to throttle economic aid to economically-deprived communities in Africa (see, for example, Talbot, 2000; Nelson, 2007).

EUSAC is blatantly hypocritical in its focus on Africa as the pervasiveness of corruption. Recent highly-publicized examples of EUSAC corruption include dossiers on British Aerospace and Saudi Arabia (Anon., 2011), the concessionary financial transactions of former President Wulff of Germany (Dahmann, 2012), and the extraordinary political influence of the *News of the World* in the UK (Halliday, 2012). The respective EUSAC governments were deeply involved in these publicly-exposed corruption cases. Indeed, corruption is everywhere, especially when there is considerable amount of money at stake. And recently the European Commission, the executive unit of the European Union (EU), an economic and political union of 28 member states primarily located in Europe has finally admitted that there is persistent widespread corruption within the public sector of many of its member states as well as in the Commission itself (European Commission, 2014).

In general, there are two basic forms of corruption. First, there is grand corruption which embodies greed and lust for power by those who already possess considerable wealth and power, and thus, large sums of money is typically involved in triggering grand corruption. And second, there is petty corruption which arises largely from economic necessity among middle ranking government and business officials (Wong, 2012). Hence, there is a continuum between the two forms of corruption which requires the participation of at least two parties. In Africa, the counter-party is often a foreign company which has a profit-driven need to secure contracts for the supply of raw materials such as minerals, petroleum, wood and other natural resources, and/or foreign governments which have certain geopolitical interest, and of course, a local collaborator is often the other party of importance in this arrangement.

During the past few decades, considerable anti-corruption funding has been provided by EUSAC ostensibly, to train African government officials (using well-paid EUSAC contractors) about public administration, governance, transparency, legal statutes, law enforcement, institution building, etc., and thus, the business of anti-corruption training and education has grown to become a thriving industry in the EUSAC.

And to date, EUSAC-sponsored activities have not appeared to have rectified the pervasiveness of corruption appreciably, and to a large extent, the underlying goal of these anti-corruption activities was to re-make Africa economically in the image of EUSAC. Del Bonido (2012) has noted the obvious double standards of the EU in its promotion of democratic principles in Africa south of the Sahara wherein in the EU vision, commercial self-interest trumps any professed democratic principles. Second, major reports issued by the UK (Commission for Africa, 2005) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2008) have provided little or no guidance on an effective means of stemming corruption, and in fact, the Commission for Africa report devoted just two sentences in its comments on the impact of the business of human slavery, missionaries or colonialism in African, although the legacy of brutal colonialism has shaped the present-day dismal socio-economic status of Africa (Cabral, 1966).

Over the past decades, the adverse of corruption in Africa have been studied by various international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund via an acute paucity of quantitative analysis of the causes of corruption in Africa and elsewhere in the world, with no definitive solutions to end the practice. Considering this failure, this study was undertaken to examine the underlying quantitative cause of corruption in Africa and to devise a practicable approach to correcting this problem. Thus, the continent of Africa forms the basis of this study in contrast to country-specific analysis which would not be appropriate for a discovery of the broad patterns of corruption in Africa. Hence, two internationally-recognized social indices, viz. Human Development Index and Corruption Perception Index were used extensively in this study to analyze the quantitative relationship between human well-being and corruption as we also recognize that other corruption indices with adequate quality standards of statistics could have been used. In unity, the latest 2008 data on health expenditure reported by the World Health Organization (2010; 2011) were deployed and per capita gross national income was used to substitute per capital gross national product (GDP) whenever GDP data were not available, and thus these two conceptually-different parameters in this study are considered to be numerically equal, for illustrative purposes.

Specifically, for clarification, the Human Development Index (HDI) was first introduced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1990 to measure development by combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment (including primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment, and adult literacy) and GDP with each indicator is considered to be an independent variable, and in 2011, per capita gross national income (including foreign remittances) replaced GDP as the “cash availability” indicator. Hence, in briefly, each of three sub-indices is calculated in consideration of the highest and lowest values reported for the specific indicator; the HDI is then calculated as the geometric means of the three sub-indices (UNDP, 2012).

Yet, the HDI of a country does not change substantially from year to year because two of the three sub-indices, viz., life expectancy and educational attainment, change only very slowly, and moreover, it was developed and constructed from a free-market capitalistic societal perspective which does not consider the importance of the continuation or preservation of cultural tradition of people as an important element of human development, although in recent years, adjustment for unequal distribution of wealth was added for the computation of inequality-adjusted HDI, but inequality-adjusted HDI still does not fully consider the gross income disparity and systemic disenfranchisement of selected groups of people within a nation. For example, the large population of “guest workers” with de facto permanent residency in many Persian Gulf states is not counted intentionally for political reasons. The social-economic status of this segment of the society which is kept largely in the state of servitude is not reflected in the national statistics for HDI calculations. And notwithstanding, nations like Cuba and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are routinely omitted from UNDP's computation of HDI because “per capita gross national income” has no meaning in non free-market economy (nevertheless, standard HDI sub-indices, i.e., without inequality adjustment, were used in this report, because of the availability of the larger pool of “standard” survey data, and HDI remains the most widely recognized means of quantifying the state of human well-beings in different countries).


Second, for clarification is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), an index published annually by Transparency International (TI), a non-profit Berlin-based organization designed to measure the degree to which corruption (abuse of entrusted power for private gain) is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians (TI, 2012), which in 2011 survey covered 180 countries. Hence, CPI is a subjective assessment of public perception as assessed by “experts” drawn largely from business people which does not characterize how the public and business officials of "less corrupted" countries are using corrupted means to win contracts and other concessions from those of "corrupted countries" or distinguish between grand corruption (theft involving large sums of money, and petty corruption, extortion of small amount of money at “the street level”), and ironically, it (CPI) is not weighted to account for the different size of the economy of a targeted country. Yet, CPI remains the best-available measure of the relative corruption of government officials, politicians as well as business persons in a particular country (a high score of CPI denotes low level of corruption), although there is presently no quantitative means to identify some elements of corruption, often characterize by greed, and a lust for power.

## **An Etiology of Corruption**

Corruption in the governance of Africa has two inter-related components, the historical and the social-economic. In the historical context, it is generally recognized that the socialization of Africa via various ethnic groups has been progressing very slowly for millennia, prior to the arrival of Europeans.

Figure 1 illustrates Africa political entities at the eve of European partition of the continent (political entities ca. 1800 in Africa relation to present day national boundaries with present political boundaries are shown in dashed lines; the map is intended as an illustration, not as a comprehensive description of pre-colonial polities). Note the difference between the pre-colonial and present-day national boundaries. Massive changes began when the Congress of Vienna (a conference of ambassadors of European states) was convened in 1815, after the Napoleonic war (1792-1815), for the establishment of a “New Imperial Order” (Chapman, 1998).

**Figure 1**



Source: adapted from Oliver and Atmore, 1967

Although the abolition of the enterprise of slavery was agreed upon by participating colonial countries at the 1815 Vienna Congress, the destruction of Africa continued by other means, and thus, the formal division of the continent was largely codified during the Berlin Conference, also known in German as the *Kongokonferenz* of 1884-1885 (Chamberlain, 2010), called by Portugal and organized by the Chancellor of Germany which regulated European colonization, business and imperialism which ended or overrode most forms of African autonomy and self-governance placing more than 90% of Africa under European control by 1902 (Chamberlain, 2000). And thus, in the division of Africa, ethnic entities were consolidated or divided involuntarily for the convenience of the European powers. A notable example was the formation of Cameroon by Germany in 1884 and the subsequent division between British and French colonial powers after 1918 with the British creation of Gambia from a strip of land along the banks of the Gambia River inside the territorial boundary of the then French colony of Senegal in the mid-1800s.

In the wanton exploitation of natural resources by the European colonial powers, massive changes in adaptive subsistence of the people were imposed. The traditional African societies and their structure were effectively destroyed within a short time span. In the perpetuation of EUSAC hegemony, new political institutions were imposed for the re-making of Africa in the EUSAC image, particularly the free-market mercantile model. The philosophical foundation of this approach is classical colonial arrogance. Ever since the decolonialization period of the late 1950s, modern-day political leaders in Africa have been fighting largely over the EUSAC-affixed political boundaries continually and ever more bitterly (Patnaik, 2006). Many of the present-day armed conflicts in Africa are abetted to a large extent by EUSAC as a part of the geo-political contest of global domination, and the promotion of EUSAC style democracy and governance in Africa is thus of minor importance. And within this environment, there are many apologists who still maintain the proposition that former colonial powers could and should intervene to provide superior governance and less corruption to present-day African societies (See, for example, Ferguson, 2002: 307, 311).

Was there a failure of historic and contemporary political leadership in Africa to cause present-day corruption? In the pre-decolonization era, EUSAC routinely used bribery, extortion and murder as an effective means of a “divide and rule” strategy to achieve hegemony (Mamdani, 2012). Thus, ardent local collaborators of EUSAC were (and still are) routinely recruited to advance EUSAC national and economic objectives in Africa. For example, the 18<sup>th</sup> century human enslavement process between West Africa and the Americas could not have flourished without the active *cui bono* participation of local African chieftains, because of the fundamental fact that there were too few Europeans in Africa to capture a large number of African residents to ensure that they would be loaded on waiting slave ship, and processed for chattel slavery in the Western Hemisphere.

Did wholesale emulation of EUSAC culture and polity by modern-day African leaders decrease the pervasiveness of corruption? In the pre-decolonization and post-colonial periods, there was (and still is) a class of leaders who placed their trust in “prosperity under the aegis of the fading colonial empire” with attendant good governance. Ardent Francophiles such as Léopold Senghor (Senegal) and Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d'Ivoire) were notable advocates of this approach (Meredith, 2006: 58-71). Post-colonial French creation of *Union Française*, *Afrique Occidentale Française* and various successor *Afrique noire* organizations heartily endorsed by Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny had not resulted in improving the life of people of Senegal or Côte d'Ivoire in a substantial way, hence; they are still mired in the low Human Development Index group with a correspondingly high degree of corruption.

Despite the highly-touted *République française* motto of “*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*” originating in the heady days of the French Revolution in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, there is no basis to believe that an African emulating all the essential French cultural features could ever become “one of them to be less corrupt”. Perhaps Senghor, Césaire and others may have been grossly mistaken to believe that *négritude* could ever become an integral part of the French identity. The works of Fanon (1952; 1964) and Braudel (1986) are particularly pertinent in this assessment. Both Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny had coincidentally enjoyed the luxuries and perks of being *députés* in the *Assemblée nationale française*. It is interesting to note that the unreserved embracing of the French culture had also awarded Senghor a membership in the august *Académie française*. In the context of Africa and other French overseas colonies, *francisation*<sup>4</sup> has been a tool to propagate French hegemony to the detriment of indigenous culture.


In contrast, progressive *indépendantistes* such as Patrice Lumumba (Congo), Sékou Touré (Guinée), Mathieu Kérékou (Benin) and Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso), have met a different fate in the post-colonial period (see for example, Meredith, 2006: 58-71; Le Vine, 2007). These political leaders were often undermined, deposed and/or eliminated by EUSAC collaborators because of their alternative political and economic policies, including the pursuit of independent social justice policies and the stoppage of corruption perpetuated by EUSAC interest.

The outlook for the elimination of grand corruption is not good as long as EUSAC continues to bribe, threaten and dispose political regimes for advancing their commercial and geo-political self interest, and thus, corruption continues.



## Socio-Economic Dimensions

There is no clear evidence that more transparency in public financial management as lectured by the Commission for Africa (2005) would correct the widespread corruption problem. The critical issue of corruption that has been ignored is whether theft is driven by economic necessity. If civil servants with meager salaries have considerable difficulties in providing the adequate necessities of life for their families, then there is an economic-survival motive to steal from the public treasury when the opportunity arises (the same analogous situation would also apply to employees of private enterprises). Intuitively, such petty corruption can be expected to be most widespread in the poorest countries, coupled with the unintended consequence of economic deprivation and social de-structuring in Africa in the uncontrollable mass migration of Africans to Europe (Wong and Gomes, 2012).



Sources: TI, 2012; UNDP, 2012

Figure 2. Human Development Index and Corruption Perception Index (number of countries surveyed)


Figure 2 shows that corruption (as depicted by CPI) is related closely with the status of human development (as represented by HDI). Note that African states are clustered at the low end of the HDI scale with correspondingly low CPI ranking. Is corruption especially prevalent to Africa? Does the legacy of historic human enslavement affect present-day corruption? There are certainly numerous non-African countries, e.g., Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Laos, Nepal, etc. in the same grouping of low HDIs and low CPIs, thus, this observation suggests corruption to be independent of Africa and/or the historic trade (enslavement) of human beings.

The least corrupt (i.e., with high CPI ranking) Nordic countries have high HDIs. Singapore is a particularly interesting case (Quah, 2001). It emerged from British colonial rule in late 1950s, at about the same time as the dawn of modern-day de-colonization in Africa. Today Singapore has a high HDI (0.866) and is generally considered to be one of the least corrupted states (CPI at 9.2) in the world. It might also be noted that the anti-corruption initiatives taken by the Singapore political leadership over several decades have resulted in well-paid civil servants, including low-ranking police officers, and thus, economic necessity has been eliminated as an underlying cause of petty corruption. Hence, it is recognized that correlation does not always imply the existence of a causal relationship to suggest that if HDI could be raised substantially, corruption would be reduced concomitantly. However, it is instructive to assess which sub-indices of HDI, if not all, could be increased to afford the desired substantial increase in CPI, i.e., less corruption.

### **Life Expectancy (LE)**

“Life Expectancy” epitomizes the end state of health of a population, and thus, this component of HDI could be improved only slowly; even through there may have been a substantial rapid improvement in health care over a short period of time. Intuitively, improvements in the supply and accessibility of nutritious food might also have an equally positive impact on life expectancy statistics. It follows that prioritization of indigenous food security through revised agriculture practices (Garrity et al., 2010) and policies (Madeley, 2000) would be an effective “preventive health” strategy. It is interesting to note that the widely used Gini coefficient, a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a nation's residents, most commonly used measure of inequality on reported income distribution (Gini, 1912) does not fully account for poverty arising from the unequal access to affordable foods by a low-income segment of a national population, because it (the Gini coefficient) only characterizes the proportional distribution of reported gross national income.

Does money buy better health care which results in higher life expectancy? Figure 3 attempts to answer this question as it shows the correlation between per capita public spending on health care and life expectancy. It is interesting to note the relative effectiveness of very different health care spending by USA and by Cuba. With a life expectancy at-birth of about 78 years, USA expended purchasing power parity (PPP) was \$7,164 per capita in 2008 (PPP is a technique used to determine the relative value of different currencies and thus allows one to estimate what the exchange rate between two currencies would have to be in order for the exchange to be at par with the purchasing power of the two countries' currencies). For a similar health outcome, Cuba expended only PPP \$495 (WHO, 2011), and in 2008, the average public spending in Africa (50 countries counted) was PPP \$196 and a corresponding life expectancy of 57 years. It would appear that the Cuban health care strategy (see for example, Arés Muzio, 2013; de la Osa, 2013) would be an excellent model to adopt in Africa.



Sources: WHO, 2010; WHO, 2011

Figure 3. Health care spending and life expectancy in 2008 (number of countries surveyed).


As given in Figure 4, the correlation between per capital gross national income and life expectancy also suggests that “money indeed buys better health care” in a capitalistic society, but up to a certain longevity threshold value. It may thus be concluded that “Life Expectancy” may *not* be a truly independent variable of the status of human development in the UNDP context.

It is somewhat puzzling to observe that in Figure 5, a correlation, albeit weak, exists between the LE sub-index and CPI. Superficially, this observation would imply that “longevity means less corruption” vice versa. A plausible explanation may be that life expectancy is not an independent indicator of human development status. With the notable exception of Cuba, it is dependent on cash wealth, as characterized by per capita GNI. In a free-market capitalistic society, cash provides, among other things, higher level of health care, including critical access to nutritious food and adequate sanitation services. In other words, the underlying relationship may in fact be between GNI and CPI.

## Educational Attainment (EA)


One of the three components used in the construction of HDI is educational attainment which is characterized essentially by years of schooling, with implicit adult literacy. It is important to note that the “Educational Attainment” does not embody any absolute or cultural quality of education received. As in the case of the LE sub-index, the EA sub-index could increase only slowly, even although there may be a rapid expansion of a free educational system at all levels over a short period of time.

In Figure 6, the apparent trend is that more public expenditure on education would result in a higher EA sub-index. Note the effectiveness of public expenditure on education in Cuba, Latvia and Lithuania. The high quality of the Cuban education system is world renown; freely available to all Cuban citizens (see for example Guzmán, 2013). It is thus a good non-EUSAC education delivery model for Africa to emulate.




Source: UNDP, 2012

Figure 4. Per capital gross national income and life expectancy (number of countries surveyed)




Sources: TI, 2012; UNDP, 2012. Figure 5. Corruption and Life Expectancy sub-index (number of countries surveyed)



Source: UNDP, 2012. Figure 6. Per capita public spending on education and Education Attainment sub-index (number of countries surveyed)


As shown in Figure 7, the indicative relationship between educational attainment and per capita GNI implies that “money could buy a better education” in a cash-based economy. As in the case of life expectancy, educational attainment would also be a dependent variable of per capita GNI in a capitalistic society.

In Figure 8, the apparent (albeit highly scattered) correlation between the EA sub-index and CPI suggests that highly educated people would be less corrupt. However, recent known corruption dossiers in EUSAC show a contrary situation (see for example, European Commission, 2014). There is no fundamental reason why highly educated individuals would be less prone to conduct corrupted practices. Thus, more education could not be relied upon directly to result in less corruption, particularly in the segment of EUSAC society which is driven by greed and a lust for power. It may be just “human nature” whenever there is a large amount of money (and political power) involved. To deter grand corruption, the only solution may be severe incarceration, large financial penalties and forfeiture of ill-gotten properties; this is the customary practice of the government of Singapore (Quah, 2011).



Sources: TI 2012; UNDP 2012

Figure 7. GNI and Education attainment sub-indices (number of countries surveyed)




Source: UNDP 2012

Figure 8. Education Attainment sub-index and corruption (number of countries surveyed)


## Gross National Income (GNI)

The “per capita GNI” component in Africa’s HDI computation could theoretically be increased substantially by the provision of a instant cash stipend in the form of a guaranteed income supplement provided to every African person. Figure 9 shows that corruption may be driven to a certain extent by economic status as characterized by per capita GNI. At least in the case of petty corruption, the “economic survival” element could be removed from the causes of corruption if the low-income people only had more money. In comparison to data presented in Figure 2, the data of Figure 9 were substantially more dispersed. This observation suggests that HDI composing of life expectancy, education attainment and per capita GNI would be a better correlate of CPI than per capita GNI sub-index alone. Figure 10 shows a good correlation between per capita GNI and non-GNI HDI, however, the correlation between non-GNI HDI and CPI in Figure 11 was not substantially better than that between HDI and CPI in Figure 2.



Sources: TI, 2012; UNDP, 2012


Figure 9. Corruption and per capita GNI sub-index (number of countries surveyed)



Source: UNDP, 2012

Figure 10. Relationship between non-GNI HDI and per capita GNI (number of countries surveyed).





Source: TI, 2012; UNDP, 2012

Figure 11. Correlation between corruption and non-GNI HDI (number of countries surveyed)

## Rectification Strategy

In view of the known computed indicators of human development and their newly-identified correlations to the quantitative corruption descriptor (viz., Corruption Perception Index), a practicable strategy could now be devised to alleviate corruption in Africa by means of altering one or more of the human development indicators. Table 1 shows an example of the calculated costs of three possible rectification strategies for the reduction of corruption through improvements in social and economic well-being of the people.

In strategy A, the sole focus of this strategy is to improve health care (viz., increasing life expectancy) and education in Africa. This strategy would cost about PPP\$1 trillion annually. From the correlation given in Figures 10, collateral improvements in per capita GNI could be expected as a result of increased public expenditure on health and education. The HDI for strategy A was re-calculated to be in the range of 0.878. The CPI of ‘new’ Africa was calculated subsequently (from Figure 2) to be about 7.7, viz., at essentially the same corruption level as in Britain. Second, in strategy B, the scheme provides a direct increase in per capita GNI in the form of a guaranteed income supplement to each person. This approach is similar to the agricultural payment provided to all EU-15 farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (EU), hence this remediation strategy would cost about PPP\$3.3 trillion annually, an on-purpose increase in per capita GNI that could also be expected to improve education and health coincidentally, according to the proposition that “more money would buy more health care and better education”.

The same method of calculations was used to estimate the likely impacts of increased in per capita GNI on non-GNI HDI (i.e., combined LE and EA sub-indices), thus the HDI of this remedial strategy was calculated to be 0.680. Therefore, on the basis of data presented in Figure 2, strategy B would not achieve any appreciable increase in the level of CPI, i.e., a situation still mired in the zone of high corruption at CPI = 3.3.

Table 1. Different strategies for aiding Africa (based on 2011 est. population of 1.0 billion)

Strategy	Principal Action	Incremental Expenditure PPP\$ billion annually	Projected HDI#	Estimated CPI**
Present	Life expectancy sub-index = 0.597; Education attainment sub-index = 0.434; per capita GNI sub-index = 0.416; non-GNI HDI = 0.509	0	0.467	2.7
A	<p>1. Improving health care Present Africa average → Target Cuban level LE sub-index 0.597 0.933 Life expectancy 58 years 78 years → per capita PPP\$211 PPP\$639 public expenditure</p> <p>2. Improving education Present African average → Target Cuban level EA sub-index 0.434 0.875 per capita PPP\$164 PPP\$737 public expenditure</p> <p>3. Allocating no specific cash input for increasing GNI per capita. Estimated GNI sub-index increase from new calculated non-GNI HDI. Present Africa average “new” Africa Non-GNI HDI 0.509 0.904 GNI sub-index 0.416 0.878*</p>	<p>428</p> <p>573</p> <hr/> <p>1,001</p>	0.895	7.7

B	Raising GNI by 100%, in the form of a guaranteed income supplement for every person Present Africa average “new” Africa GNI PPP\$3,257 PPP\$6,514 GNI sub-index 0.416 0.598 Non-GNI HDI 0.509 0.725*	3,257	0.680	3.3
C	Target annual economic aid starting by 2010 (One Campaign, 2008) to achieve up to 6% increase in GDP by 2020 (UNCTAD, 2006).	25	?	?

# calculations made according to UNDP (2012) methodology

\* calculated from Figure 10 correlation

\*\* estimated from Figure 2 correlation

Next, in strategy C, the 2005 New Partnership for Africa’s Development program was aimed to provide Africa with a target of PPP\$25 billion of aids annually over the 10 years from 2010 to 2019 (One Campaign 2008). With a population of 1 billion people, the per capita economic benefit would be about \$25 annually. This small amount of funding could not be expected to achieve any meaningful improvements in Africa in terms of health and education to cause subsequently an appreciable reduction in corruption, thus, it is interesting to note that much of the foreign aid pledged at the 2005 summit of G-7 countries was in fact used to cancel old debts (Curtis 2005), and therefore, the net amount of new funding to be provided was actually even more miniscule.

Additionally, the combined GDP of G-7 countries (viz., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA) was about PPP\$29 trillion in 2009 (Hawksworth and Tiwari 2011); the proposed funding of strategy A at PPP\$1 trillion annually would be equivalent to approximately 3.4% of the combined GDP of the 7 richest nations, and in comparison, the 2005 United Nations Millennium Goal for official development assistance was set at 0.7% of GDP of developed countries (Townsend, 2010) is a actually a paltry level of promised economic aid, and even if it was doubled, it would be grossly inadequate to solve corruption in Africa arising from severe social and economic deprivation caused to a certain extent by past colonial exploitation and the wholesale destruction of African societies.

## Funding Issues

The two fundamental questions are what would be the appropriate form of transfer payment and how would the proposed annual funding requirement of PPP \$1 trillion be sourced, transfer payment and foreign aid.

Hence, the professed goal of foreign aid from EUSAC is to improve the human well-beings of the people of recipient countries. Unfortunately, most of current “increased aid” initiative has been expended on increasing trade (Vidal, 2002; Sachs, 2005; UNCTAD, 2006; UNECA, 2008) and debt cancellation (Africa Action, 2008; One Campaign, 2008) as a means of raising the national GDP ultimately to benefit the commercial interest of EUSAC. In practice, increased GDP through trade means larger exportation of African commodities virtually for the sole benefits of Africans (viz., native agents of EUSAC) in power, and for foreign commercial interest (Sogge, 1999; Kimber, 2005). This development model provides little or no prospect for improving the daily lives of ordinary African people significantly, and thus, it appears to be part of a continual exploitation of African natural resources in the guise of “partnerships” (Jung et al., 2011; Bölinger, 2012).

It is well known that foreign aid is rarely given as generous untied assistance (Trebilcock, 2010). They are generally provided in the form of loans or grants with specific commercial conditions attached often designed to favour the political and/or commercial interest of the donor country. This orthodox free-market model of lending Africa more money would in fact enslave Africa again. Africa would be constantly under pressure to implement economic reform which is not necessarily in congruence with indigenous cultural traditions and societal structure. For example, private-property rights of land have no meaning in some African pastoral and agrarian societies, and thus such EUSAC demand is another manifestation of a neocolonial arrogance to remake Africa for serving its own commercial and geo-political interests.

The contemporary view of donor countries and institutions is that Africa must undertake profound “structural reform”, i.e., strict adoption of the EUSAC free-market economic model via the privatization of essentials services such as potable water supply which actually enriches foreign commercial corporations. Also, improved efficiency in tax collection is often cited as a vital tool of economic reform in Africa, but the people are often too poor to be taxed further. And interestingly, EUSAC is always vehemently opposed to any increased taxation collection of African raw materials needed by EUSAC as tax avoidance is a finely-honed method for EUSAC trans-national companies to operate in Africa. For example, the sugar production business in Zambia removing \$2 billion annually from the Zambian national treasury via Associated British Foods, a British trans-national operating company may be immoral, but it is legally acceptable to the UK government (Boffey, 2013).

In the disbursement of foreign aid, Easterly (2006) has advocated gauged spending on smaller selected projects with essentially unchanged level of foreign aid. In contrast, Sachs (2005) has been arguing for more foreign-aid money to spend on the high-profile large scale projects which could transform the local economic structure. And for different reasons, Moyo (2009) has advocated the termination of foreign aid to African governments to eliminate dependency, corruption and poor governance. However, with only relatively small differences in approaches, Easterly (2006), Sachs (2005), Moyo (2009), and Sumner and Mallett (2012) are all advocating essentially more free-market policies, albeit in slightly different form, as the sole effective approach to reduce poverty in Africa, although the performance of free-market policy in Africa has been mixed at best.

For example, the reported economic miracle of free-market policies as practiced for decades in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire for example is untrue. The HDIs of these countries have always been near the bottom of the HDI scale for decades. And in this context, South Africa is also not a good example of free-market policy achievements as its high national "economic status" is actually the continued legacy of severe economic disparity inflicted on the indigenous people built during the Apartheid years, and thus the rights of workers to fair wages and safe working conditions were still routinely abrogated and suppressed in the pursuit of nation building, in a monopolistic free-market business setting (see, for example, Smith and Macalister, 2012).

The wholesale adoption of the EUSAC free-market approach would result in the continued exploitation and re-enslavement of Africa. In essence, Africa will survive as servants of EUSAC economic interest. The most prominent example of free-market policies is the unfettered land grab by foreign entities (with the collaboration of native agents of course) in the name of aiding local development (de Schutter, 2009; de Schutter, 2010; Vidal, 2012; Mwakideu, 2012). In many cases, the immediate aftermath is that the natural environment is despoiled and the people driven from their ancestral land and are left with no means to develop their own food production (Provost and McClanaham, 2012) as famine persists in Africa (Devereux, 2009), and the lack of access to modern crop technologies has often been cited as the underlying cause (Djurfeldt et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2009; de Graff et al., 2011). And furthermore, under the free-market development model, the substantial changes in land tenure system (Stamm, 2009; Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010) and the national priority for deploying the best arable land for the production of exportable food crops (Madeley, 2000; Wong, 2010) has been introduced into the traditional landscape, resulting in a growing dependency of the people on imported foodstuff of which prices are subject to intense manipulation in the futures financial markets in London and New York (Hartwich, 2009; de Schutter, 2011; Ghosh et al., 2011; Worthy, 2011). Hence, perpetuation of neo-colonialism is exemplified by the "New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition" formulated as a foreign aid initiative at the 2009 G8 Meeting in L'Aquila, Italy (Anon., 2013) which has been roundly criticized as the latest means to enslave and impoverish the people of Africa once again under the guise of eradicating poverty (Provost et al., 2013).

And in view of the past history of EUSAC commercial and geo-political interest in Africa, it would not be surprising to find that bribery and coercion was deployed by EUSAC to induce various African states to join the program.

Considerable discourse is continuing on the achieved benefits of foreign aid as the miniscule improvements in well-being after the influx of more than \$500 billion of foreign aids to Africa since the 1960 has often been cited a proof of the failure of foreign aid (Burrows, 2003; Vasquez, 2005; Nelson, 2007). Failures that are not necessarily always the fault of African leadership, with few exceptions, but rather on a foreign aid policy for Africa based on the template to re-make Africa in the image of the EUSAC free-market market model as the social and cultural history of Africa is denigrated and ignored (Fanon, 1952). This orthodox modality of development strategy of modern-day Africa is fundamentally inappropriate and unworkable, and it is well known that EUSAC countries have been persistently undermining any indigenous development policies. Recall, for example, the fate of governments of Sékou Touré in Guinée and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. These progressive national leaders had chosen not to accept EUSAC “foreign aid” for the implementation of political and economic framework to serve EUSAC’s geopolitical and commercial interest, and in Congo, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was even murdered for this defiance (Fanon, 1964; Brittain, 2011). Hence, it is evident that the present deprived state of African society and economy could not be remedied with the continued self-serving disguised benevolent intervention of EUSAC to maintain its geopolitical hegemony.

## **Reparations**

Foreign aid denotes charity at the discretion of the donors who have changing geopolitical and commercial objectives. Foreign aid is essentially charity disbursed at the whims of the donors. Interestingly, foreign-aid promotion and administration have become a growth industry in EUSAC countries during the past few decades, with the participation of many self-serving musical entertainers and politicians, and thus, the termination of this growth industry may be very difficult to realize.

Perhaps natural justice could be served if the foreign aid in the form of cash, was recognized as reparation payments for centuries of wanton exploitation of African human and other resources by EUSAC interest. The late 20<sup>th</sup> century precedent in war-crime reparation payment was that made by Germany to Israel (Bassock and Marker, 2009). The initial agreement reached in 1952 was the payment of 3 billion Deutsche marks (valued at about €14 billion presently) over 14 years and in 2009, the Israeli government made a new payment demand of another €1 billion plus other non-cash concessions for the remaining 30,000 survivors of the misdeeds of the Third Reich.

In equal application of justice, Africa is unquestionably is entitled to be compensated for the sufferings endured by its people during the entire colonial period. For example, over 10 million people were exterminated by operatives of King Léopold II of Belgium during the exploitation of the Congo Free State between 1885 and 1908 (Hochschild, 1999). The ownership of the Congo Free State was transferred officially by King Léopold II to the Kingdom of Belgium in 1908. If the same German-Israeli reparation formula was applied, i.e., about US\$3,700 per survivor for each year of persecution by the Third Reich regime from 1933 to 1945, then the one-time payment owing by the present-day Belgian government for crimes committed by King Léopold II against humanity in the Congo Free State from 1885 to 1908 would be US\$850 billion! There is no statute of limitation on crime against humanity<sup>5</sup> (UNHCHR, 1970; ICCS, 1998). And to fortify this argument, as of November, 2011, all EUSAC countries, without the exception of the Unites States of America, have ratified the Rome ICC Statute which provides no statute of limitation for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

This calculated indemnity may appear to be a hardship for present-day Belgians to redeem the sins of their past rulers. But it is not nearly as devastating to Haitians as the reparation demanded by France from Haiti for the “grant of independence” to Haiti in 1804. Haiti had taken almost 150 years to pay off entirely the original demand of 150 million francs, in gold (and reduced in 1838 to 90 million francs in gold) for its freedom. The smaller 1838 sum is equivalent to about US\$18 billion today (Marquand, 2010). To this day, Haiti has yet unable to recover from extreme poverty manifested during the 150-year reparation period.

It may be noted that none of the crimes against humanity in Africa by other colonial states such as Britain, France and Germany has yet to be accounted. Some notable examples of crime against African humanity would include the German 1904 massacre of the Herero and Namib people in southwest Africa (Biles, 2006; Sarkin-Hughes, 2009) and the atrocities committed by Britain against the Kiyuyu people of modern-day Kenya during the 1950s (Elkins, 2004; Cobain et al., 2012). Public apologies made reluctantly by governments for past atrocities committed against the people are inexpensive and insufficient. In the case of Germany, reparations for the crimes committed during the era of the Third Reich were miniscule in proportion to the long lasting destructive effect of these crimes against the people. To this day, the British government is ironically still trying to conceal evidence of its crime against humanity committed in Kenya in the 1950s (Cobain and Hatcher, 2013; Cobain, 2013).



## Funding Source


The “economic stress” on the donor countries may be very manageable, if there was a sustained re-deployment of military expenditure to fund the proposed development plan. And in this regard, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that the 2010 military expenditure of the top 10 countries in the world was about US\$ 1.22 trillion, about 75% of the global total (Africa accounts for 1.8% of the global total military expenditure). Table 2 shows the European colonial powers spent about US\$246 billion on military activities in 2010, hence, if these colonial-9 countries could reduce their military budget by 90%, there would be a “disposable” US\$123 billion available for social development in Africa, a figure that would be miniscule compared to the US\$25 billion offered to Africa in the Millennium Development Goal program (One Campaign, 2008).

Table 2. Publicly-disclosed military expenditure of former European colonial powers in 2010.

		<b>US\$ billion</b>	<b>Post-1815 African colonial history</b>
1	Belgium	5.8	Present day Democratic Republic of Congo was its primary colony
2	Denmark	5.3	No colonies in Africa since 1815
3	France	59.3	Colonies in western and northwestern Africa
4	Germany	45.2	Present-day Cameroon, Tanzania and Namibia were its colonies
5	Italy	37.0	Present-day Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya were its colonies
6	Netherlands	12.8	No colonies in Africa since 1815
7	Portugal	4.2	Present-day Angola and Mozambique were the principal colonies
8	Spain	16.8	Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea were the primary colonies
9	United Kingdom	59.6	Colonies largely in western, eastern and southern Africa
	Colonial-9	246.0	About 84% of EU-27 total
	EU-27	293.7	About 5 million active, reserve and paramilitary personnel

Source: adapted from SIPRI, 2011

As shown in Figure 12, the military expenditure in Africa has been rising steadily since 2001. African countries spent about US\$30 billion on military affairs in 2010. If the military expenditure could be reduced by 90%, then another US\$27 billion could be freed up for the implementation of strategy A as described in Table 1.



Source: adapted from SIPRI, 2008; SIPRI, 2011.  
 Figure 12. Total annual military expenditure of African countries.

Thus, the total money available from (a) avoided military expenditures by the colonial-9 countries, (b) previously committed economic aid (viz., US\$25 billion) and (c) avoided African military expenditures could be about US\$273 billion, about 27% of the projected amount required for “rectifying corruption” in the full implementation of strategy A. But interestingly, we know that it somewhat unrealistic to expect the “colonial-9” countries to ever purposefully reduce their military expenditures considering that their military armament industry is an entrenched element of the national economy of many EUSAC countries (Smith, 2012). And thus, the military armament industry needs continuing government-facilitated exports, even if bribes, coercions and other unethical means had to be used (Taylor and Maltezos, 2010; Amies, 2010; Anon, 2012).

Therefore, it is recognized lump-sum disbursement of the sudden annual influx of a large sum of money of the magnitude formulated in strategy A that will likely cause uncontrollable economic chaos in recipient countries. However, this money management problem could be overcome if the annual funding was increased progressively over a 10-year period to the target level of PPP\$1 trillion annually.

## **Concluding Remarks**

Low Human Development Index has been shown to correlate to a high degree of corruption, not only in Africa but also elsewhere in the world, and poverty as exemplified by the lack of adequate access to the basic necessities of life such as food, housing, education and health care, appears to be the underlying cause.

Grand corruption is characterized by greed and a lust for power. Continuing economic exploitation perpetuated by EUSAC is a significant factor causing this form of corruption within communities in Africa, an economic practice is a continuation of centuries of EUSAC colonial policies, which have included bribery, coercion, murders, and thus, a practicable remedy for grand corruption.

Petty corruption is driven by poverty and usually perpetuated by low ranking civil servants and private-enterprise employees, and for the suppression of petty corruption, a reduction of poverty through substantial increase in development funding to improve health and education specifically would be an essential first step. Hence, a perplexing question might be: does corruption cause poverty or the reverse? The answer is probably yes to both side of this circular question. However, the preceding quantitative analysis of key human development indicators suggests that a practical solution would lie in addressing the poverty issue first. And thus, the classical approach of eradicating corruption first, e.g., through intensified training in governance, stricter enforcement of improved laws, greater procurement transparency, accelerated implementation of free-market economic policies, increased conditional foreign aids, etc. has shown to be largely ineffective as the basic needs of the people are not met.

In a comparative analysis of corruption Abdulai (2009) blamed the lack of political will to combat (petty) corruption in Ghana to Singapore and Hong Kong, yet the situation is somewhat more complex. Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore) became political leaders in their respective country at about the same time with the ambition of building a new society freed from onerous British colonial rule, but in contrast, Nkrumah was undermined and finally deposed (with the connivance of EUSAC) because his “communistic” social justice agenda whereas Lee survived (and tolerated by EUSAC) to influence Singaporean politics to the present day because of his capitalistic free-market approach of nation-building, although the draconian measures to suppress political dissidents in both Ghana and Singapore were probably very similar, but in Ghana, “political will” and other economic means to reduce corruption never had a chance to take root.

Rücker (2014) has presented an interesting argument that personal dignity (of high officials) is an important factor in deterring public-sector corruption in Singapore. The proposition about the deciding role of embedded classical Chinese cultural practices of, among other things, obedience and filial piety could only be partially valid as it does not account for the similarly low incidence of corruption in the significant non-Chinese segment of the Singaporean society. Moreover, the Rücker argument bordering on the rationalization of cultural and/or racial superiority is somewhat unfounded because it is well known that corruption occurs everywhere in the world, i.e., not particularly culture or race-based. In Singapore, the driving force for opportunistic corruption has been and is effectively removed by routine generous remuneration for public-sector workers and elected officials.

The cash input for poverty reduction (and consequentially corruption decrease) would not and should not be assigned as foreign aid. Regardless of the free-market economic development model of Sachs (2005), Easterly (2006) or Moyo (2009), foreign aid is charity which locks Africa into a state perpetual beggars. This inflow of EUSAC money should be modeled after the scheme of unfettered cash reparation provided by Germany to Israel for the former's past misdeeds during the Third Reich, and thus, Belgian reparation for heinous crimes against humanity committed by King Léopold's henchmen in Congo between 1885-1908 (Gondola, 2002; O'Síocháin and O'Sullivan, 2003) would similarly be justified, considering there is no statute of limitation for crimes against humanity (UNGA, 1968).

## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> The probable origin of the present-day common saying of "people living in glass houses should not throw stones"

<sup>2</sup> Corruption, *n.* 1. evil or wicked behaviour; depravity. 2. bribery. 3. decay; rottenness. (Webster's New World Dictionary)

<sup>3</sup> This acronym groups Europe (especially former and present colonial powers, viz., Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), USA, Australia and Canada. These countries have largely similar social-cultural-economic-political structure. EUSAC is considered more appropriate than the commonly-used "The West". Japan, often considered to be "The West", was excluded explicitly from this grouping as its societal traditions are different. Prior to the 1950s, Australia and Canada were integral subordinate states of the British Empire.

<sup>4</sup> *Francisation* as a national cultural assimilation policy began in 1539 under the reign of François I with the promulgation of the Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts (Garrisson, 1995: 170-208). This Royal edict was designed to impose the dominance of French language and culture for the development of French identity during the course of territorial consolidation of the French state over the next 470 years. Some examples of this cultural-domination policy within present-day boundaries of metropolitan France are the draconian *francisation* of Occitans, Bretons, Catalans, Corsicans and Basques.

<sup>5</sup> ICCS Article 29 states that genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes "shall not be subject to any statute of limitations". The 1968 Convention adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2391 (XXIII) prohibits signatory state from applying statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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